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I.   INTRODUCING STORIES 
Narratologists commonly draw a distinction between the story and those things that 
tell the story- the tellings, as I will call them here. Here is an example intended to 
highlight that distinction. The Parable of the Sower is a parable found in the New 
Testament books of Matthew, Mark and Luke, and in the non-canonical Gospel of 
Thomas. Though the relevant pieces of text in the Gospels are remarkably similar, no 
two of the four are identical. The verses in Matthew, Mark and Luke, have been 
translated and paraphrased, along with the rest of the Bible, into literally thousands of 
different languages and versions, all of which include the The Parable of the Sower.        
     The Parable of the Sower is the story told, and the Gospels, paraphrases and 
translations are the various tellings of that story. At the heart of the distinction, and 
presupposed in the example above, is the idea of the 'transposability' of the story: the 
thought that the same story can be told by different tellings. The same story is told by 
numerous children's picture bibles, and animated cartoons, and could be recounted 
here with little trouble. If I told the The Parable of the Sower here, I would not 
thereby increase the number of parables, though I would increase the number of 
tellings. Jonathan Culler describes this distinction (under its various terminological 
guises) as the “indispensable premise of narratology.”1  
     While the narratologists' approach focusses on the structural features of narrative, 
very little has been said about the ontology of this distinction. In a recent paper, Aaron 
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Smuts (2009) has opened up this long overdue issue for debate by considering the 
identity conditions for stories. Smuts sets out the question as follows: 
 
[...] what exactly constitutes the “story” that is retold? Although it is plausible to 
say that the same story can be retold, it is difficult to say exactly what this 
means. The primary difficulty for proponents of the transposability thesis is to 
come up with an acceptable theory of story identity.2  
 
Smuts then goes on to set out a dilemma that anyone attempting to answer this 
question will find themselves in. According to Smuts, either we accept an account of 
story identity that means that the same story is hardly ever told twice, or, escaping that 
horn, we end up with an account that collapses any distinction we might want to keep 
between genuinely telling the same story and just having two tellings which exhibit 
the same story type. In sections 2 and 3 I will set out the two horns of Smuts dilemma, 
before arguing, in section 4, that an account stories as abstract historical individuals 
offers a way of avoiding the dilemma. 
 
II.  SMUTS’ DILEMMA: THE FIRST HORN 
According to narratologists, the distinction between the story and that which tells the 
story is something like the distinction between the content of a representation and the 
form of a representation. Seymour Chatman, for example, writes that the story is “that 
content or chain of events (actions, happenings), plus what might be called the 
existents...”.3 This suggests that we might understand the story as the collection of all 
those things described by the telling. From this idea Smuts proposes the “strict theory 
of story identity” such that the story is “the complete set of event, character, and 
setting details that are presented in the work.”4  
     There is some ambiguity here between claims about identity conditions and claims 
about ontological categories. That is, Smuts initially sets out to offer a theory of story 
identity, but in doing so offers the stronger suggestion that stories belong to the 
ontological category of sets. At this stage I want to focus only on the identity 
conditions, and I will suggest that the “strict theory” can be tightened up somewhat as 
follows: 
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3
  Chatman (1978), p. 19 
4
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Strict:  Two tellings, t1 and t2, tell the same story iff the set of propositions true 
according to t1 is the same as the set of propositions true according to t2.
5
 
The ‘propositions true according to the telling’ are just all those things made out by 
the telling to be the case, and are intended to correspond to Smuts notion of “details 
presented in the work”. It might be thought that there is some disparity between that 
which is (perhaps implicitly) true according to a telling, and that which is 'presented 
in the work', but short of a detailed discussion of how one would make that distinction 
in a principled way (and which one would be more appropriate for story identity), it 
will do to overlook it for our purposes. Various accounts can be found in the literature 
of precisely how to determine what is 'true according to the telling' (or as it is often 
put, 'true in the story') but, again, we need not look into those here.6 All that we 
require for now is the somewhat intuitive notion that Smuts is working with, for that 
is enough to show how unattractive an account it seems to be. The problem starts 
when we realise that while Strict gives us precision, it makes it that case that we 
hardly ever tell the same story twice. As Smuts puts it, “it makes it practically 
impossible to transpose the story”.7  
     Suppose, for example, that I want to retell The Parable of the Sower using a comic 
strip, and I draw the sower as having brown hair. Then by most accounts it will be 
true according to my telling that the sower has brown hair. However, it is no part of 
the original tellings that the Sower has brown hair, and so according to Strict I will 
have failed to tell the same story. Examples can be multiplied almost ad infinitum, 
especially when we see, as Smuts points out, that any move from print to stage or 
screen will involve significant changes in the information represented, due to the 
unavoidable introduction of visual details. Could we really accept that no production 
of Hamlet could ever tell the same story as the the play script of Hamlet?8 
     It should be noted that Strict will still allow us to tell the same story in the sense of 
reading the same text aloud to an audience multiple times, but what we are 
specifically interested in here, rather, is our ability to re-tell the same story across 
                                                 
5
  This strict account of story identity is apparent in Zalta (1983) p.91 
6
  The conversation generally starts with Lewis' paper 'Truth in Fiction' reprinted in Lewis (1983) and 
amendments have been put forward by, for example, Currie (1990), Byrne (1993) and Hanley (2004). 
7
  Smuts (2009), p. 6 
8
  What if one were tempted to just 'bite the bullet' on this and answer 'yes' here? I return to this 
possibility in section 4. 
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different texts, or across different mediums (to transpose the story). It is little 
consolation that reading the same text aloud involves telling the same story if two 
productions of the same play, or a production and a play script, do not.  
     Smuts goes on to consider, and reject, some possible ways of avoiding this 
unintuitive result whilst holding on to the strict theory. However, those details need 
not concern us here. What is important is the outcome: Strict is just too strict as an 
account of story identity. 
 
III.  SMUTS’ DILEMMA: THE SECOND HORN 
Given this result, Smuts sensibly considers looking for a more lenient approach to 
story identity. Smuts suggests that in reaction to the problems of the strict view, we 
may want to develop an account of stories that view them instead as something like a 
higher-level type. Types, understood along the lines of 'token-binders',9 are entities 
that admit of instances (their tokens) and are individuated by the conditions necessary 
for something to count as a token of that type.  Two particular tellings then count as 
telling the same story (type) if they have a certain set of shared 'essential attributes' – 
attributes specified by the identity of the story type in question. On this type-token 
view, the story is identified by the conditions that must be met by a telling to count as 
a telling of that story.  
     This certainly has some prima facie plausibility. We can intuitively distinguish 
between events, details and characters that are essential to the story for it to be that 
very story, and those that are relatively unimportant. We might deem it essential to 
telling the story of Romeo and Juliet that two people from opposing groups fall in 
love and that their plans to be together end in tragedy, but we are unlikely to be 
bothered by colour of Romeo's hair. Thus we might propose the following account as 
an improvement to Strict: 
 
Lenient:  Two tellings, t1 and t2, tell the same story, S, iff there is a core set of 
propositions essential to story S true according to t1 and true according to t2.  
 
In other words, we can retell any story as long as we include in our retelling all of the 
essential details or features of the original story.  
                                                 
9
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     Smuts raises two problems for this account. Firstly Smuts claims that this view 
causes serious problems for the original distinction between the telling and the told. 
He argues that “the elements that are essential for any given story will be highly 
idiosyncratic”10 and will likely come down to salience. Those elements that we deem 
essential to a story will often be just those that are most salient. However, salience, for 
the most part, will be a feature of the presentation – a feature of how the story is told. 
(Michael Corleone's first killing in Mario Puzo's The Godfather is a salient event in 
the film in part because of the intense camera work and attention to detail during that 
scene.) This is a problem, Smuts thinks, because what the story is will no longer be 
independent of how the story is told. He writes that 
 
The very transposability of the story is called into question if the defender of the 
theory of story identity as an abstract type must make reference to elements of 
salience, since salience is at least partly determined by the discourse from which 
the story is supposed to be independent.11  
 
However, I think that Smuts is mistaken in supposing that this is a real problem for an 
account of story individuation along the lines of Lenient. This is simply because it is 
no part of the distinction between the story and its telling, as understood here and as 
understood by narratologists, that the story be entirely independent of its tellings. On 
the contrary, the story that is told by any telling will be in many ways dependent on 
features of the telling, including salience and emphasis. What is salient will depend on 
the presentation just as much as the story told will depend on the presentation, so 
there is no problem with essential elements of the story told coinciding with salient 
features of the telling. Thus I think that reliance on salience is no real problem for this 
account of story identity. 
     The second problem raised by Smuts for this account has more bite. The argument 
here is that if we accept Lenient, or something similar, we lose our grip on the 
distinction between two tellings that tell the same story, and two tellings that merely 
tell the same kind of story. Arguably this distinction is very important to critics. Using 
Smuts example, while we surely want to say that Wooster Group's production of 
Hamlet and Laurence Olivier's production tell the same identical story, the film Maid 
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in Manhattan and Disney's Cinderella only tell the same kind of story. We might 
predicate of these latter two that they both tell Cinderella stories, and we don't mean 
here that they tell the exact same story, but just that the stories that they do tell are of 
the same general kind or type.  
     However, kinds, like types, are individuated by the conditions something must 
meet to be a member of that kind. Hence an account of what it is to tell the same kind 
of story is going to look very similar to Lenient, with perhaps only a more relaxed or 
more minimal set of core propositions put in as the requirement. The upshot of this, 
for Smuts, is that our account “risks failing to be able to make the distinction between 
story identity and story type in a non-ad hoc manner.”12 Telling the exact same story 
will be merely a limiting case of telling the same kind of story, but intuitively genuine 
identity and sameness of kind are ontologically distinct. 
 
IV.  AVOIDING THE DILEMMA: STORIES AS HISTORICAL INDIVIDUALS 
At the end of the paper Smuts suggests a preference for choosing the first horn and 
accepting the consequences. But this ‘bite the bullet’ response would have much of 
our ordinary practice about story identification to have been mistaken. I suggest such 
a move would demand significantly more theoretical motivation than has been 
offered. One might reluctantly accept it if it was the only card on the table.13  
     However, I want to put forward a third option that avoids this dilemma. The 
problem, I want to argue, is that both of the above accounts make the mistake of 
viewing the story as a kind of ‘generic entity’. This is a common move in ontology 
when faced with entities that are not ‘concrete’ – that is, that are not spatially and 
temporally located physical objects.  Such ‘generic entity’ accounts have been given 
for words, properties, propositions, works of music, novels, and photographs (to name 
a few). As generic entities, these are then understood in terms of a set of conditions 
that an ‘instance’ of the entity must meet in order to be an instance of that entity. For 
example, it might be claimed that a musical performance is a performance of such and 
such a work if, and only if, it sounds like so and so. The musical work is a generic 
entity that demands that its instances sound a certain way.14 
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  Smuts (2009), p. 12 
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  My worry, briefly, is that accounts that take us to have been significantly in error with our 
identification practices risk 'changing the subject' of the enquiry all together. See Thomasson (2009). 
14
  For example, see Dodd (2007) 
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      The claim I want to make here, though, is that this is the wrong model to apply to 
stories. Instead, I argue that we should view stories as historical individuals.15 There 
is only time here to offer the beginnings of such an account, but I hope to show that 
even a brief description will mark it out as a serious contender for the ontology of 
stories, and one that also avoids Smuts’ Dilemma. 
      Chairs, tables, paintings, pets and people are all historical individuals. They come 
into existence at a certain time (they are created or born), they change through time 
(grow older, get damaged), and they can be destroyed. Stories, I want to argue, share 
all of these characteristics with familiar objects. One important respect in which they 
differ is that stories are abstract.16 By this I mean just that stories are not the kind of 
things that have a spatial location. To ask where a story is is just a category mistake 
on par with asking how much January 2nd weighs.  
     Stories come into existence: Unless we are tethered by some metaphysical 
constraints about abstract entities, it is not hard to be persuaded that stories come into 
existence. They are created by individuals when they are first told. The story of 
Romeo and Juliet did not exist before Shakespeare, and came into existence when 
Romeo and Juliet was written. Likewise The Parable of the Sower did not exist before 
Jesus uttered the relevant words. 
     Stories change through time: This is highly plausible, especially if we consider the 
folk tales and ballads of the oral tradition. As the story is passed on from one 
generation to the next, it changes in small (and sometimes large) ways as details are 
added and dropped. The development of the printing press has surely had a significant 
impact on story change, but change is still present even in the digital age. When the 
novelist drafts and re-drafts their book the novel changes and so does the story that is 
being told. Similarly, when a group of writers work on a series drama for television 
the story being told will undergo the radical change of growing considerably over 
time as new series are added.  
     Stories go out of existence: Stories go out of existence just when it is no longer 
possible for any tellings of the story to be produced. It is difficult to find examples of 
                                                 
15
  The concept of an abstract historical individual is from Guy Rohrbaugh (2003) where he applies it 
to art works and to photographs in particular.   
16
  On this point my account of stories differs from Rohrbaugh's account of works of art, which he 
suggests are not abstract, though non-material (see his  2005). A full discussion of this difference is  
outside the scope of this paper. 
GEOFF STEVENSON 
 
 31 
this, but we can imagine that the folk stories of a lost civilisation no longer exist in 
virtue of there being no records or memories of those stories.  
     If these are correct claims to make about stories, then it is a mistake to try and 
understand stories in terms of a set of conditions that a telling must satisfy in order to 
tell that story. Hence we need not accept either Strict or Lenient any more than we 
should accept that we have the same chair on two different occasions if and only if 
they both have the same appearance (surely the same chair can be red and upright one 
day, and blue and broken the next).  
     Instead, retelling a story will be (something like) a matter of being causally 
connected to a previous telling in the right kind of way, such that one is deemed 
capable of telling that story, and that one intends to tell that very story. We might also 
suppose that the audience must accept that telling as a telling of that story. Clearly 
this judgement will involve recognising important elements, but crucially it is no 
longer the inclusion of some fixed set of elements that make it that story being told (I 
may be recognised by my appearance, but I am not individuated by my appearance).  
     This view of stories as historical individuals, rather than as generic entities, does 
not immediately answer every question we might have about story identity and the 
nature of stories. However, it does help explain the apparent confusion over the 
distinction between genuine story identity and stories that are merely of the same 
story type (or kind). A story type is a generic entity, and for a story to be a member of 
that type it need only posses the required set of characteristics, as specified by that 
type (such as 'boy-meets-girl' or 'Cinderella story'). The confusion then arises due to 
the ambiguous nature of our language: sometimes we want to say that two stories are 
the same historical individual, and at other times we want to say that two stories are 
merely of the same story type. Consider my claim, for example, that you have the 
same watch as me. Here I mean the same type of watch. But I might also say that the 
watch I was wearing this morning is the same watch as the one you are wearing now, 
and here I perhaps mean to say that you have stolen my watch. As it is with watches, 
so it is with stories. Wooster Group's production of Hamlet and Laurence Olivier's 
production tell the same story as historical individual; the film Maid in Manhattan and 
Disney's Cinderella tell the same kind of story (as generic entity).  
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     Clearly there is much more that needs to be said to flesh out an account of stories 
as abstract historical individuals,17 but if we can let go of the assumption that stories 
are generic entities, a path is opened up via which we can navigate away from Smuts' 
Dilemma.18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17
  And see Dodd (2007) p.143-166 for a criticism of a related view. 
18
  Thanks to Julian Dodd and an anonymous referee from The Postgraduate Journal of Aesthetics for 
very helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Needless to say, they are not responsible for 
any failure on my part to fully take on board their suggestions. 
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